



JOURNAL OF

APPLIED LANGUAGE AND DISCOURSE STUDIES (JALDS)



A Poetics of Free Indirect Discourse in Prose Narrative Fiction: A Theoretical Synthesis Within the Framework of the Dual-Voice Hypothesis

Mohammad Ghaffary* 

Department of English Language and Literature, Faculty of Letters and Languages, Arak University, Arak, Iran

Use your device to scan
and read the article online



Citation: Ghaffary, M. (2026). A poetics of free indirect discourse in prose narrative: A theoretical synthesis within the framework of dual-voice hypothesis. *Journal of Applied Language and Discourse Studies*, 1(1), 5–27.



<https://doi.org/10.66224/jalds.1.1.5>

KEYWORDS

discourse representation,
free indirect discourse,
dual-voice hypothesis,
focalization, polyvocality

ABSTRACT

“Free indirect discourse” (FID) is one of the most complex and problematic modes of representing characterological consciousness in literary discourse that gained considerable significance in written storytelling specially in the wake of High Modernism. The present article aims at offering a theoretical synthesis of the most prominent accounts of FID in (English-language) prose narrative fiction within the framework of the classic theory known as the “dual-voice hypothesis.” First, characterological discourse and its constituent elements in narrative fiction are illuminated. Next, the different modes of the narrator’s representation of characterological discourses are discussed separately according to the quadripartite model, which includes direct discourse (DD), indirect discourse (ID), free direct discourse (FDD), and free indirect discourse (FID). Then, in an extensive survey that interweaves structuralist and poststructuralist accounts, the textual markers of FID, as a dual voice, and its functions in narrative fiction are examined. The poetics offered in this paper supports the dual-voice hypothesis, namely that the presence of FID in a narrative often results in “polyvocality,” a state in which different narratorial and characterological discourses co-exist, without one predominating the others. Exploring the relations of this vocal ambiguity to such formalist, structuralist, and poststructuralist concepts as semantic density, defamiliarization, polyphony, intertextuality, *différance*, and deterritorialization, the study concludes by demonstrating how FID renders the narrative “writerly,” a positively ambiguous text open to various and even

* Corresponding author.

E-mail address: m-ghaffary@araku.ac.ir

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.66224/jalds.1.1.5>

Received: 14 February 2026.; Received in revised form: 29 April 2026; Accepted: 11 May 2026

Article type: Original Article



conflictual interpretations, and that accordingly it can be deemed an index of the literary and the narrative.

1. Introduction

Early twentieth century writers, later called (High) Modernists, embarked on a quest for modernizing their narrative devices and, thus, began to experiment with various linguistic and formal techniques for expressing individual experience and appreciating its significance. This attempt was based on the presupposition that each individual perceives reality in their own way, and that there is no such thing as ultimate reality. Such a fictional “perspectivism,” according to Jesse Matz (2004), is directly connected with Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of “heteroglossia” and what Erich Auerbach terms a true political “democracy” (pp. 59, 53). In order to demonstrate perspectivism, writers began to depict individual characters’ mental processes, that is, how they perceive and analyze external realities. This required that each mind have a rather unique language—what Roger Fowler (1989) labels “mind style” and defines as “any distinctive linguistic presentation of an individual mental self” (p. 103). These experiments, which resulted in a full linguistic consciousness on the writers’ part, set the scene for a totally novel narrative fictional style in the twentieth century that arguably helped the novel survive as the major literary form of the modern period.

The main concern of Modernist fiction is individual characters’ consciousnesses and mental lives or, more precisely, “a flow of reflections, momentary impressions, disjunctive bits of recall and half-memory, simultaneously revealing both the past and the way the past is repressed” (Stallworthy & Ramazani, 2018, p. 21). This approach to fiction was later termed “stream of consciousness fiction” (Humphrey, 1954). Accordingly, in Modernist fiction, the representation of a character’s inner discourse (= speech + thought + perception) with lesser degrees of narratorial mediation replaces the narrator’s description of the character’s external actions or surroundings and/or the all-knowing narrator’s subjective reports on the characters’ mental processes as the major device for characterization and/or narration. Put differently, conventional “objective” narration, so to speak, gives place to subjective internal focalization.

The most significant and problematic mode of representing characters’ discourses is perhaps “free indirect discourse” (FID) or “free indirect style,” an effective technique for presenting the way a character may perceive their surroundings and presenting, at the same time, the narrator’s attitude toward that character. The recourse to FID as a narrative discursive technique in prose fiction assumed significance in the early nineteenth century and in the fictional works of such writers as Jane Austen (1775-1817), particularly *Emma* (1815). However, it was in the Modernist period that FID attained perfection and became an established device for representing characters’ speech and thought, most prominently in James Joyce’s *Dubliners* (1914) and, a decade later, in Virginia Woolf’s *Mrs. Dalloway* (1925) and *To the Lighthouse* (1927).

Employing a library-based method for data collection, the present article aims to provide a theoretical synthesis of the “classic” accounts of FID in narrative fiction, often referred to as the “dual-voice hypothesis” (Pascal, 1977), and accordingly provide answers for the following questions: What is free indirect discourse (FID)? What are its characteristic textual features in prose fictional narratives? What are its major functions in narrative fiction? How is it distinguished from the other modes of discourse representation (DR), namely direct discourse (DD), indirect discourse (ID), discourse report, and free direct discourse (FDD)? Is it possible to make sharp distinctions among the three subtypes of FID, namely free indirect speech (FIS), free indirect thought (FIT), and free indirect perception (FIP)? And, lastly, in what ways is FID related to such concepts as focalization, stream of consciousness (SOC), interior monologue (IM), and their subcategories?

To date, many essays, theses, and books have been devoted to the study of FID and its various aspects in European languages and, in particular, in English. Offering a review of all those studies—even simply listing them—certainly goes far beyond the limited scope of a journal article. Therefore, here only a brief historical account of the early seminal studies in European languages is provided and then, in the body of the article, the most significant theoretical studies in English are summarized and synthesized to reach a rather comprehensive account of the textual markers and functions of FID in English-language prose fictional narratives. To delimit the scope of the review, among the different theories of FID—including Ann Banfield’s (1982) theory of FID as “unspeakable sentence,” Monika Fludernik’s (2005b) complex account of FID, which goes much beyond Banfield’s purely linguistic theory, and the psychonarratological account offered by Marisa Bortolussi and Peter Dixon (2003)—the present research only focuses on the classic conception of this linguistic form, known as the “dual-voice hypothesis,” first named so by Roy Pascal (1977) and later expanded mainly by Michal Peled Ginsburg (1977), Brian McHale ([1978] 2004), and Michael Toolan (2001). Due to the limited scope of such an article, many other studies, however important, had to be left out of the survey.

FID was first identified as a peculiar linguistic form by Adolf Tobler (1887), the German linguist (1835-1910), who defined it as a mixture of DD and ID, using the term *eigentümliche Mischung direkter und indirekter Rede* (“idiosyncratic mixture of direct and indirect speech”) (Schmid, 2010, p. 170; see also Ginsburg, 1977). The next researcher who brought this technique into the focus of linguists and stylisticians was the French linguist Charles Bally (1865-1947). Bally (1912) referred to the technique as “le style indirect libre” (free indirect style) and examined its use in French texts and with regard to French grammar. V. N. (Valentin Nikolaevich) Vološinov (1973), the Russian linguist (1895-1936) and a member of Mikhail Bakhtin’s circle, investigated the practice of FID—what he called “quasi-direct discourse” (p. 112)—in the nineteenth-century narrative fiction and within a leftist socio-political framework. His work, originally published in Russian in 1929, was a critique of the previous theories of FID and an emphasis on the novelty of this device in the literature of the time. In the second half of the twentieth century, Pascal (1977) undertook a practical examination of this technique, which he termed “free indirect speech,” in the works of such nineteenth-century European novelists as Jane Austen, Charles Dickens (1821-1880), Gustave Flaubert (1821-1880), and Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821-1881). Seemingly, it was Pascal who first employed the term “dual voice” to refer to the bivocal nature of FID, although almost all theorists long before him had described FID as containing at least two voices. In a Persian study that invests historical analysis with practical considerations, Mohammad Ghaffary and Amir Ali Nojournian (2013b) first compare FID with the other DR modes in narrative fiction and, then, compare its use in High Modernist and nineteenth-century Realist fiction to demonstrate how FID was deployed in Modernist fictional works such as Joyce’s *Dubliners* and Woolf’s *Mrs. Dalloway* more consciously, more systematically, and, as a result, more effectively. In a separate study, Ghaffary and Nojournian (2013a) also deal with the way FID can be employed and/or adapted in filmic narrative fiction, especially in art films in which the subjective world of the central character takes center stage and often merges into the so-called “objective” world of the cinematic narrator, leading to a dual-voice or polyvocal discourse.

McHale (2009) believes that considering DR as always involving “a quoting frame and a quoted inset” implies that DR always embraces two agents (the quoter/narrator and the quotee/character) or two voices (p. 439). These voices are almost clearly distinguishable in all modes of DR, except in FID, where the two voices are combined or superimposed. This is named “the dual-voice hypothesis” of FID. A number of theorists have preferred the term “polyvocality” in referring to the combination or superimposition of voices in FID (e.g., McHale, 2004, p. 210). More precisely, polyvocality occurs in a narrative text when, apart from the narrator’s and the character-focalizer’s voices, there is the extra voice of at least one more

character focalized from within by the character-focalizer. Theoretically, this chain of internal focalizations can, of course, continue endlessly. Nonetheless, such cases indeed rarely happen, and the general state is a merger of the character-focalizer's and the narrator's voices, in which case the term "bivocality" is preferable to polyvocality.

2. Results and Discussion

2.1. Discourse Representation (DR)

Simply put, narrative discourse is the way the basic story materials are narrated by the narrator, using various structural, textual, or stylistic devices (Genette, 1983a). According to Gérard Genette (1983a), narrative discourse consists of narrative of events and narrative of characters' words, both of which are narrated by the fictional narrator. Likewise, Lubomír Doležal divides narrative discourse into "narrator's discourse" and "character's discourse" (Jahn, 2025, 8-01). The former is the narration of non-verbal events in addition to the narrator's evaluative views and comments, the latter being the narration of verbal events and the characters' speeches. A character's discourse is narrated within the narrator's; thus, it is the narrator's discourse that is after all in control of the entire narrative, reproducing and modifying the characters' discourses. The term "discourse representation" (DR) can be used to refer to the narrator's different ways of representing the characters' discourses.

Bortolussi and Dixon (2003) maintain that DR plays a significant part in narrative as it

can advance the plot, provide direct information about the speaking characters and their reactions as well as indirect information about other characters, present the reader with a variety of perspectives or viewpoints, convey attitudes and judgments of the narrator, and communicate thematic content. (p. 200)

Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (2008) regards DR as a useful way of characterization or, more exactly, indirect presentation of characters in narrative fiction. In fact, the significance of DR in narrative fiction, as Fludernik (2005a) reports, has been recognized as early as the ancient Greeks. In the third book of the *Republic*, Plato—through the character of Socrates—distinguishes three kinds of reporting speech: "diegesis" (narration), "mimesis" (direct quotation), and a mixture of the two, i.e., diegesis with moments of mimesis (Hernadi, 1972, p. 32). In diegesis, the poet (= narrator) is the speaking voice, narrating both the events and the characters' discourses alike: It is "a minimum of information and a maximum of the informer" (Genette, 1983a, p. 166). In mimesis, the poet (= narrator) reproduces the exact words of the characters, giving the reader the illusion that it is not s/he who is speaking (Rimmon-Kenan, 2008, p. 107). Mimesis is, then, a maximum of information with a minimum of the informer. Ginsburg (1977) believes that in diegesis language is transparent and what it presents is important rather than how it is presented, whereas in mimesis language becomes opaque and words occupy a central place.

In modern narratological studies of prose fiction, various models of DR have been proposed (e.g., see McHale, 2004; Leech & Short, 2007; Jahn, 2025), among which the recognized quadripartite model seems the most comprehensive. According to this model, there are four major types of DR, namely "direct discourse" (DD), "indirect discourse" (ID), "free direct discourse" (FDD), and "free indirect discourse" (FID) (cf. Toolan, 2001; Dry, 2002). Each of these categories may have certain subtypes, which count as minor modes (and, thus, are not considered in the present study for the sake of conciseness). The adoption of this model would leave no room for vague pre-narratological concepts like "direct interior monologue" (DIM), "indirect interior monologue" (IIM), and "soliloquy" (see Humphrey, 1954). The four major DR modes are illustrated as follows:

- 1) "I knew you when you were a child," said Gabriel. → DD
- 2) I knew you when you were a child. → FDD
- 3) Gabriel said (that) he had known her when she was a child. → ID
- 4) Gabriel [he] had known her when she was a child (Joyce, 2001, p. 128). → FID

The first sentence is DD: the extradiegetic narrator "directly" quotes the character's (Gabriel's) words and allows us to hear his own voice within the text. Sentence 2 is the same as 1 but "freed" from the tagging/reporting clause "said Gabriel," which renders it FDD. The third sentence is the narrator's "indirect" report of Gabriel's speech, not his exact words, as in 1, so the voice we hear is the narrator's. In order to become ID, the pronouns and verb tense of DD are adapted to the narrator's position and his discourse. Sentence 4 is similar to 3 but "freed" from the initial reporting clause "Gabriel said (that)"; therefore, it is FID.

While investigating the relations between the character's and the narrator's discourses, certain narratologists, such as Genette (1983a) and McHale (2004), propose several spectra of DR with regard to the classical notions of diegesis and mimesis. As McHale (2009) points out, the more direct and faithful to the character's "original" discourse, the more mimetic the DR is. Thus, FDD is the most mimetic mode, DD less mimetic than FDD, and ID the most diegetic. FID is, then, neither purely diegetic nor purely mimetic but a form uniquely in between or, as Toolan (2001) puts it, "a mimetic diegesis (a telling that shows or presents aspects of the character's 'own' words or thoughts)" (pp. 134-135). FID is more mimetic than ID and less mimetic than DD or, alternatively, more diegetic than DD but less diegetic than ID. (The Platonic concepts of "diegesis" and "mimesis" can be analogized with Percy Lubbock's (1921) notions of "telling" and "showing," respectively.) Ginsburg (1977) regards FID as "a mimesis which tries to pass for a diegesis" and concludes, in poststructuralist terms, that FID cannot be included in either poles of the traditional binary opposition "diegesis/mimesis" (pp. 34-35). Paul Simpson and Martin Montgomery (2002) treat DR as an index of focalization in fiction and suggest that FID is an index of internal focalization. Similarly, Toolan (2001) argues that the more mimetic modes of DR—i.e., DD, FDD, and FID—are characteristic of internal focalization, whereas the more diegetic forms—i.e., ID and its subtypes—are appropriate for external focalization. It might be added that the former group are suitable for presenting the focalized from within but the latter for presenting the focalized from without.

Based on the continuum advanced by Geoffrey N. Leech and Mick Short (2007), there is a direct relationship between diegesis/mimesis and the cognitive distance between the narrator and the character(-focalizer): the more diegetic the DR mode, the more distance between the character and the narrator, and the more mimetic the DR mode, the less distance between them. Therefore, ID involves the highest degree of distance and FDD the least. Nonetheless, such categorizations have been rejected by certain critics on the grounds that "degree of faithfulness does not correspond to formal categories" and one could find, for example, some instances of DD that are "highly stylized and un-mimetic" while some ID sentences might appear more mimetic than DD ones often are (McHale, 2009, p. 438).

Last but not least, by DR, the narrator attempts to give the narrative a realistic or authentic aspect (Fludernik, 2005a), so that the reader could deem their report of the story world reliable, yet such authenticity is a mere illusion because the narrator is allowed to select what discourse to *re-present* and how to represent (and appropriate) it. Furthermore, DR may result in a change in narrative perspective and bring about a greater or lesser degree of empathy in the reader with a specific character—a subject that shall be addressed below in more detail (for a practical study

of the role DR in narrative fiction and film based on the quadripartite model explained above, see Ghaffary & Hashemi, 2024).

2.2. Speech, Thought, and Perception

As Genette (1983b) states, narratives always turn thoughts into either speech or event, and there is no third category (i.e., thought). Thus, free indirect thought (FIT) would be a kind of or, rather, identical to free indirect speech (FIS), because one might argue that thinking is not possible without language or that thinking is a verbal process/act. This is also true of interior monologue (IM), which, as its name shows, is language-based as, according to *Oxford English Dictionary* (2009), “-logue” in ancient Greek originally meant “speaker” or “speaking” (s.v. “monologue”). On the other hand, certain theorists opine that thinking *is* possible without language and, accordingly, distinguish interior speech from thought (Genette, 1983b). Alan Palmer (2004) appears to put forward a solution to the speech/thought problem: “sometimes thought is highly verbalized and can accurately be described as inner speech; sometimes it is not and so cannot” (p. 65).

The above discussion considered, one can argue that the term “discourse” in such phrases as “direct discourse” and “free indirect discourse” generally signifies both a character’s (un)uttered speech and their verbalized thought/perception. As mentioned above, a number of scholars divide each DR mode into the speech and thought subtypes, e.g., “ID = IS (indirect speech) + IT (indirect thought) + IP (indirect perception)” and “FID = FIS (free indirect speech) + FIT (free indirect thought) + FIP (free indirect perception).” However, especially in the case of FID, often it is practically impossible to separate speech from thought. For instance, if we face the FID sentence “He still loved her!” in a narrative text, how could we decide whether it has been uttered or thought by the character in question? Therefore, it is better to use the umbrella term “discourse” for both subcategories.

Moreover, another subcategory can be considered for discourse in this context, namely a character’s (sense) perception, when it is represented in the narrative discourse by the narrative voice. Hence, the four types of perception representation: DP (“It is so hot,” he felt*), IP (He felt that it was so hot*), FDP (It’s so hot! [in a “third-person” narrative with past tense]), and FIP (It was so hot!). Of course, some of these sentences, marked by an asterisk, may not be well-formed or commonly used but count as probable forms in English fictional prose. Among them, IP and FIP have been previously recognized by certain theorists. Laurel Brinton calls IP “represented perception” (Fludernik, 2005a, p. 563) and FIP “narrated perception” (p. 561). Paul Hernadi (1972) calls FIP “substitutionary perception” (p. 38), and Louise Flavin (1985, p. 38) and Palmer (2004, p. 48) employ the term “free indirect perception.” As for IP, Dorrit Cohn (1978) and Palmer (2005) consider it a subtype of what they respectively term “psychonarration” (p. 11) and “thought report” (p. 603), both of which equal ID. Apparently, the other scholars who follow the quadripartite model of DR have not recognized IP as a separate subcategory, perhaps regarding it simply as narrative report.

Toolan (2001) introduces another mode among his categories of DR that seems to be a subtype of ID and FID: “pure narrative sentences” (PN), e.g., “She sat at the window watching the evening invade the avenue” (p. 119). This concept is similar to Leech and Short’s (2007) “narrative report of action” (NRA) (p. 260) and Robert Humphrey’s (1954) “description by an omniscient author” (pp. 33-34), although it may overlap with “discourse report” to a certain extent (see the subsection “Indirect Discourse” below). PN is the narration of a character’s physically overt and observable actions. It may also describe inward details—especially when the character themselves seems not to be aware of them—as well as those mental/verbal acts that do not appear to be the character’s expressed discourse, e.g., “His mind went blank; he couldn’t get his thoughts straight” (Toolan, 2001, p. 119). In this case, PN is a meta-discursive

commentary “on how the character was thinking or speaking, rather than reports on what they thought or said” (Toolan, 2001, pp. 119-120). Indeed, Toolan’s first example purports to be IP and his second one FIP.

2.3. Direct Discourse (DD)

DD is a direct, word-for-word quotation of a character’s discourse which is enclosed within quotation marks and presented alongside a reporting clause (s/he said, “...”), so DD is a “tagged” discourse (Jahn, 2025, 8-03), for example: “‘Is it snowing again, Mr Conroy?’ asked Lily” (Joyce, 2001, p. 128). Genette (1983a) calls it “imitated or reported discourse” (p. 170) and Cohn (1978) ambiguously terms it “quoted *monologue*” (p. 12, emphasis added). In the case of DD, it is often possible to distinguish speech from thought because of the kind of reporting verb used for tagging the character’s discourse, e.g., “to say,” “to tell,” “to ask,” and “to think.”

The major characteristic of DD is the interdependence of the deixis or deictic elements of the quoted material. It is somewhat a faithful report of what the character has actually said. In DD, there exist two distinct voices, one the quoter’s (= the narrator’s) and the other the quotee’s (= the character’s). They are clearly distinguishable due to such grammatical markers as the embedding of the quotee’s discourse in the quoter’s and the quotation marks. Here, the character’s voice is dominant and they speak for themselves; however, as Toolan (2001) remarks, this seems to be illusory since it is the narrator who stands behind all fictional characters and ultimately represents their discourses. DD may be employed by a fiction writer when a character’s use of expressive or subjective features, e.g., interjections and dialectalism, is narratively significant (Toolan, 2001). It is also a useful device for internal focalization or representing the focalized from within, although it may not be so effective as FID or FDD.

Mieke Bal (2004) argues that the “change in the level of focalizing is [...] parallel to the change in narrative level” (p. 282), that is, a shift from the metanarrative to a hyponarrative. If one accepts this idea, one can conclude that in DD the narrator yields the floor to the character whose discourse is directly reported, i.e., the character, in a sense, becomes the narrator of the hyponarrative/embedded narrative. At the same time, this narrator-character can be a focalizer in their own right, perceiving a focalized object/character from within or without.

2.4. Indirect Discourse (ID)

When the narrative perspective shifts from the character to the narrator, the narrative discourse has actually switched from DD to ID. ID is the indirect quotation of the character’s discourse, in the form of a reporting clause with the optional subordinating conjunction “that,” or other similarly functioning conjunctions such as “whether” and “if,” plus the reproduced content of the character’s discourse (Short, 2013); for instance: “She herself said that it [= the pudding] was not quite brown enough” (Joyce, 2001, p. 144).

Compared with DD, ID “can offer a gain in pace and economy by way of compensation for the loss of immediacy” (Page, 1988, p. 33). As Fludernik (2005a) suggests, in comparison with the other modes of DR, overall ID “tends to be more factual, brief, and content-oriented” (p. 562). Norman Page (1988) believes that ID “combines more readily with narrative style, making possible a free movement from one to the other” (p. 33). After all, in ID the narrator is free to reproduce the character’s discourse in any way they desire, i.e., the narrator can choose to provide a paraphrase, an interpretation, or a summary of the character’s discourse, translating it into their own discourse or even only mentioning the subject of the discourse. Cohn (1978) calls ID “psychonarration” (p. 11) and Palmer (2005) designates it “thought report” (p. 603). It also embraces those subcategories of DR that Genette (1983a) labels “narratized or narrated discourse” and “transposed speech” (p. 170).

Palmer's (2005) "thought report" includes the exact paraphrase of the character's discourse as well as the other forms mentioned above (summary, etc.). Nevertheless, we can employ the term "ID" in referring to all such subcategories and reserve the term "discourse report" specifically for those ID sentences that summarize the content of the character's discourse or give us solely its subject matter, e.g., "He thought about his problems with his mother," although it is not always possible to distinguish these subcategories from faithful paraphrases. Thus, "discourse report" is equal to Humphrey's (1954) pre-narratological term "description by an omniscient author" (pp. 33-34), Genette's "narratized/narrated discourse," Leech and Short's (2007) "narrative report of speech acts" (NRSA) (p. 260) plus "narrative report of thought acts" (NRTA) (p. 270), and Jahn's (2025) "narrative report of discourse" (8-11). McHale (2004) discerns three types of this form: 1) "diegetic summary" only mentions that a discourse event has occurred (e.g., "[...] he started telling war yarns for the first time in his life"); 2) "summary, less 'purely' diegetic," mentions the subject matter of the speech event (e.g., "He stayed [...] telling them about miraculous conversions of unbelievers, [...]"); and 3) "indirect content-paraphrase" tends to paraphrase the character's discourse but regardless of its style or form (e.g., "The waiter told him that Carranza's troops had lost Torreón and that [...]") (p. 195). This categorization can be compared with Page's (1988) distinction among "submerged speech," "coloured/modified IS," and "parallel IS," as three subtypes of ID (pp. 35-36). Discourse report, as Palmer (2005) acknowledges, is sometimes indistinguishable from FID or, more precisely, FIP, which he elsewhere defines as the narrator's description of the events or states in the narrative world as experienced by the character under consideration (Palmer, 2004). On the other side, Seymour Chatman (1980) holds that FID is distinguishable from discourse report on the grounds that the latter totally occurs within the narrator's discourse and lacks the subjective/expressive materials of the character's discourse.

Due to the kind of verbs used in the reporting clause (e.g., "to say," "to tell," "to ask," "to wonder," and "to realize"), IS can usually be discerned from IT, just as DS can be distinguished from DT. It should be noted that not all reporting verbs used in the introductory clauses of DD can be employed in ID and vice versa. For example, the verbs "to query," "to intone," and "to think aloud" can only be utilized in DD. On the other hand, verbs such as "to recommend," "to reveal," and "to mention" can accompany only ID (Banfield, 1973).

As McHale (2004) explains, traditional grammarians have based their discussions of DR upon the false assumption that there is a derivational relationship among the modes of DR: ID is derived, through some syntactic transformations, from DD and, likewise, FID is derived from ID. McHale sees this account as flawed because "in fiction [...] there is no direct 'original' prior to or behind an instance of ID or FID; the supposedly 'derived' utterances are not versions of anything, but themselves the 'originals'" (p. 193). Nonetheless, he is not able to provide a substitute account for the linguistic markers of these forms and consequently relies on the same traditional descriptions, according to which ID is derived from DD through the following process:

- i) Suppression of quotation marks, and optional insertion of the conjunction *that* before reported declaratives;
- ii) Conversion of personal and possessive pronouns from first or second person to third person;
- iii) Conversion ("back-shift") of verb tenses [...];
- iv) Conversion of [other spatiotemporal] deictic elements: demonstratives [...], temporal and spatial adverbs [...].

- v) Transformation of direct questions [...] in the form of subordinate *wh*-clauses, with inversion of the auxiliary + subject word-order of direct questions;

[...]

- vi) Transformation of direct imperatives [...] rendered indirectly either as a *that*-clause with modalized main verb, or as an infinitival clause;

[...]

- vii) A variety of features which may appear freely in DD utterances seems to be barred from ID: vocatives, interjections, lexical dialectal features, etc. [...] (McHale, 2004, pp. 188-189).

Following McHale's critique of traditional descriptions, Toolan (2001) proposes another list of linguistic markers for ID that apparently removes the false conception of derivation and instead embraces the differences between the two forms:

1. DD has character's tense; ID has narrator's tense.
2. DD has character's pronouns; ID has narrator's pronouns.
3. DD is graphologically set apart [by quotation marks]; ID is not.
4. DD is paratactic and complementizer-free; ID is hypotactic and complementizer-prone.
5. DD has character's deixis; ID has narrator's deixis.
6. DD has character's lexis/colouring; ID has narrator's lexis/colouring. (p. 130)

As it appears, this comparative list avoids referring to "removal" of, for example, quotation marks or "insertion" of, for instance, the subordinating conjunction "that."

What is more, unlike DD, in ID there exists only one voice, namely that of the quoter/narrator, because they have translated the quotee/character's discourse into their own. Thus, if there are any evaluative words in ID, they should be ascribed to the narrator, not to the character (Banfield, 1973). One might object that, like DD, ID contains two voices, yet what is important is that in ID one of them, i.e., the narrator's voice, is in total control of the other, i.e., the character's. Put differently, the narrator filters the character's discourse in ID far more than in DD. As Toolan (2001) elucidates, in ID the narrator speaks on behalf of the characters, distancing themselves from the characters at issue. ID, according to Toolan, highlights the act of narrating/reporting, intervening, and distracting the reader's attention from the narrated/reported material. A writer may adopt it when the character's vividness, prominence, authenticity, or autonomy are not appropriate or necessary, e.g., when the character is only a minor figure in the narrative or where the topic of discourse is boring or repetitive (Toolan, 2001). Furthermore, IT associates the character's inner processes to their environment, displaying concretely "the social and active nature of thought" (Palmer, 2005, p. 604).

Leech and Short (2007) argue that DS is the norm for speech representation "because it is the mode that represents speech in the form in which it is directly manifest to a listener," whereas for thought representation the norm is IT since thoughts are not generally verbalized, so they cannot be reported word by word as in DT; as a result, IT, as a mode in which the writer commits themselves solely to the content of the character's thought, is more appropriate for thought representation. In addition, Flavin (1985) suggests that in cases where the narrative is

restricted to a specific character's mind, that is, in internal focalization, it is more acceptable to employ DT for thought representation rather than IT, because IT implies more involvement on the narrator's part; thus, it is more suitable for external focalization or representing the focalized from without.

2.5. Free Direct Discourse (FDD)

DD minus the reporting clause and the quotation marks equals FID (Ghaffary & Nojournian, 2013b). Since FDD is freed from the attributive/tagging clause, Jahn (2005) calls it "untagged DD" (N8.5.). Likewise, McHale (2004) calls FDD "DD shorn of its conventional orthographic cues" (p. 196). Gerald Prince (2003) describes it as "a character's utterances or thoughts [...] (presumably) given as the character formulates them, without any narratorial mediation" (p. 34). For instance, if the following sentence occurs in a heterodiegetic narrative with a general past-tense scheme, it will count as FDD: *Is it snowing again?*

Katie Wales (2013) claims that FDD, in particular FDS, is often used along with DD (DS) or in the middles of a series of DSs "to save repetition of reporting" (p. 174), but it is perhaps safer to say that FDD is mostly used for the unmediated representation of a character's mental events, not necessarily to avoid repetition of the tagging clauses of DD. FDD presumably happens in the character's mind, and the reader becomes aware of it before it is articulated by the character. FDD roughly equals the pre-narratological term "direct interior monologue" (DIM) (see Humphrey, 1954, p. 25). Therefore, FDD differs from FID much in the same way as DIM differs from "indirect interior monologue" (IIM) (see Humphrey, 1954, p. 29). The deictic elements of FDD, including pronouns and verb tense, agree with the character's position and perception, while in FID some of the deictic elements correspond to the narrator's position and discourse.

Like ID, in FDD, there exists only one voice but, unlike ID, here it is the character's voice which is heard in the text, not the narrator's. One might object that, like DD and FID, in FDD there are two voices at work. However, as was mentioned before in the case of ID, the important thing about FDD is that only one discourse is dominant in it. The character speaks/thinks/perceives for themselves, and the narrator's discourse seemingly does not intervene in this process. Put another way, the character's discourse is only minimally filtered by the narrator: The narrator's perspective is minimized, and the character is in supreme dominance. Thus, FDD is a useful technique for internal focalization or representing the focalized from within. Besides, like DD, in FDD narration shifts from the narrator's metanarrative to the character-focalizer's hyponarrative.

2.6. Free Indirect Discourse (FID)

FID is in fact a hybrid form, having a combination of DD and ID features (Short, 2013): It is an indirect sentence, lacking the reporting clause but instead having some subjective characteristics that make it resemble DD, for example: "Perhaps he ought not to have answered her like that" (Joyce, 2001, p. 137). Genette (1983a) treats FID as a variant of what he labels "transposed speech" (= ID) (p. 172), and Cohn (1978) calls it "narrated monologue" (p. 13). It can also be equated with Humphrey's (1954) "indirect interior monologue" (IIM) (p. 29), although certain critics, including David Lodge (1992), regard FID as a narrative technique opposite to interior monologue (IM).

The adjective "free" in FID means that the discourse is "non-embedded" (Banfield, 1973, p. 3, n. 3). As McHale (2004) explains, FID is "free" not only because it is not dominated by a "higher" reporting verb, as traditional grammarians would say, but also because it covers a wide range of formal possibilities. Jahn (2005) holds that, although many theorists define "free" here as free from a tagging/reporting clause, FID is sometimes accompanied by a "tagging clause,"

particularly a parenthetical one, i.e., one which has a medial position in the FID sentence; thus, it is better to make a distinction between “tagged” FID sentences (those collocating with a tagging clause) and “untagged” FID sentences (those lacking any tagging clause) (N8.6.).

On the other hand, Ginsburg (1977) calls FID “free” in the Freudian sense of free association—eliminating the deliberate selection of thought—and brings it close to “stream of consciousness” (SOC), although he intends to distinguish FID from SOC (for a distinction between FID and SOC, see Ghaffary & Nojournian, 2013b). This indicates that, for Ginsburg, the meaning of an FID sentence is ambiguous, undecidable, or plural. FID, in this sense, lays bare “the discontinuity between the conscious and the unconscious,” “the splitting of the ‘I,’” or “a divided self” (Ginsburg, 1977, p. 23). This theory seems to have considerable implications in the case of central characters of Modernist fiction. Ginsburg goes on to argue that the adjective “indirect” in FID suggests that it is not a means for communication, which usually involves a “direct relationship between addresser and addressee,” neither of realism, which entails a “relationship between language and the [external] world”; rather, it shows that “the subject is always excentric [= extrinsic] to his[/her] own discourse” (p. 24). Therefore, according to Ginsburg, in FID “indirect” signifies the displacement of the subject (cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s (1986, 2004) idea of “deterritorialization,” which is addressed below).

The use of FID, as a linguistic structure in European languages, can be traced to the medieval romances and even to the ancient Greeks (Fludernik, 2005b). Therefore, considering it a characteristic feature of Modernist fiction does not mean that it was invented by Anglo-American fiction writers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Rather, linguists happened to identify this structure in that period and at the same time many writers became aware of it as a key technique for representing characters’ inner worlds and mental processes. It should also be added that most scholars deem FID a literary form that is now observed solely in narrative fiction, although its origin might go back to everyday language in former periods (see, *inter alia*, Banfield, 1973; Ginsburg, 1977; Toolan, 2001; McHale, 2004).

Genette (1983b) maintains that FID corresponds more to the expression of internal thought than to the citation of uttered speech. FID is, in fact, halfway between speech, thought, and perception (FIS ↔ FIT ↔ FIP), such that it is not possible, in most instances, to decide to which subcategory the FID sentence belongs. As McHale (2009) states, in FID person deixis and verb tense evoke the narrator’s discourse, while spatiotemporal deixis and subjective/expressive features evoke the character’s discourse. In other words, the reader may assume that one mind (= the narrator) is responsible for the form of the discourse and another (= the character) for its content (Hernadi, 1972). Then, of course, it would be univocal, just like ID; nevertheless, as discussed below, the reader often is not able to exactly determine the source of the voice heard within the narrative text.

According to Toolan (2001), in FID two entirely separate situations of utterance are juxtaposed:

situations with quite different participants (character-to-character versus narrator-to-reader) and quite different spatiotemporal settings (the “then” of the story versus the “now” of the telling/reading), and with convergence only in the area of subject matter (a character’s represented thoughts or speech are experiential subject matter for that character, but also the subject matter of the narrative for its readers). (p. 139)

Franz K. Stanzel uses the term “infection” when referring to a mixing of the narrator’s and the character’s languages or styles and believes that infection reaches its climax in FID (Fludernik, 2005a, p. 560). Therefore, like DD and ID, there exist (at least) two voices in FID but, unlike

them, the two voices are indistinguishable in FID. Pier Paolo Pasolini (1976) defines FID as a “re-lived discourse,” for through FID the author (= narrator) “penetrates entirely into the spirit of his[her] character, of whom [s/]he thus adopts not only the psychology but also the language” (pp. 549-550). Hence, what remains can be attributed neither purely to the narrator nor purely to the character in question.

Chatman (1980) argues that there are three kinds of FID: those attributable to the character, those ascribable to the narrator, and ambiguous cases in which the source of the voice is not clear. One of the theorists who have carried the ambiguity of FID to its extreme is Ginsburg (1977). First, like Chatman, he recognizes at least three types of FID, yet his categorization is somewhat different from Chatman’s: those which can immediately be described as a character’s discourse; those which can be ascribed either to the narrator or to the character; and eventually those which can be attributed neither to the narrator nor to the character. In addition, Ginsburg (1977), in a poststructuralist fashion, states:

since [the third type of] FID[—which is also the most important of all—]always contains contradictory and irreconcilable signs, it constitutes a structure of undecidability that transgresses and violates binary oppositions such as the grammatical one direct/indirect speech and the literary ones diegesis/mimesis, *discours/récit*. [...] it puts into question the possibility of referring the origin of an utterance to a subject. (“Abstract”)

Thus, he rejects any attempt to determine the source of the voice in FID because it has never belonged to a particular subject and no speaker could have ever articulated it (cf. Deleuze and Guattari’s (1986, 2004) notion of “deterritorialization,” addressed below).

2.7. Textual Markers of FID

As was mentioned, McHale (2004) believes that traditional grammarians built their studies of DR on the false assumption that ID is derived, through certain syntactic transformations, from DD, and then FID is derived from ID. He criticizes this view but, relying upon the same traditional accounts, fails to provide a proper linguistic description of these modes. In the section on ID, it was shown how ID is derived from DD according to traditional grammar. Here, McHale’s (2004) account of how FID is derived from ID is recapitulated:

- i) Deletion of the reporting verb of saying/thinking + [the subordinating] conjunction *that* (or *wh*-words, *whether*, or *if* [...]);

[...]

- ii) Retention of the shift of person and back-shift of tenses characteristic of ID;
- iii) Reinstatement of deictic elements of DD [...];
- iv) Reinstatement of the auxiliary + subject word-order of direct questions;
- v) Reinstatement of those [subjective/expressive] DD features such as interjections which were (problematically) barred from ID. (pp. 189-190)

Toolan (2001), as was also pointed out, seems to have found a solution to McHale’s problem: instead of a derivational/transformational account, he proposes a differential model. His comparative description of DD and ID was cited in the section on ID. As for FID, he postulates that it is a “selecting and blending of the ID or narratorial option for 1, 2, and 3 [in his description of DD vs. ID] (tense, pronouns, and graphological nonremovedness), but the DD or characterological option for 4, 5, and 6 (main clause syntax [...]; no complementizers; and character’s space/time deixis and lexis/coloring” (Toolan, 2001, p. 130). Thus, FID is “neither

direct nor indirect [...], but mixings or mergings of narratorial indirectness with characterological directness” (p. 131). He also remarks that the subjective/expressive material of the character’s discourse maintained in FID can lead to parallel graphological eccentricities in the text, representing “the non-standardness of the character” (p. 133). Toolan goes on to suggest that, in this sense, it becomes difficult to distinguish FID from narrative report (“pure narrative sentences” [PN] in his model); nevertheless, he argues that with the help of one linguistic feature, which is most observable in FID, one can separate FID from narrative report or other DR modes, and that is “modality”—the presence of features such as modal verbs (e.g., “would,” “could,” and “might”) and sentence adverbs (e.g., “certainly,” “perhaps,” and “seemingly”), which express “judgments about the likelihood or necessity or desirability of some action or state” (p. 131) or reveal the speaker’s attitude toward the truthfulness of their own utterances.

Fowler (1989) argues that the commonest marker of FID is a combination of “proximate” deixis (referring to elements of space and time close to the speaker, a characteristic of DD) and “non-proximate” deixis (referring to elements of space and time far from the speaker, a characteristic of ID) or, more precisely, the “combination of past tense (non-proximate) with the proximate temporal adverb *now*,” e.g., “[...] things *had* gone pretty well up to *now*” (p. 102; emphasis in the original). Thus, in FID the boundary between DD and ID is blurred or violated (Banfield, 1973). Put differently, what makes FID is the existence of features from both DD and ID, so that one cannot trace it to either of them (Ginsburg, 1977).

Moreover, Fludernik (2005a) believes that although FID is untagged by a preceding or following reporting clause, its independence is an illusion due to the fact that it is ultimately dependent on the referential and temporal aspects of the surrounding narratorial discourse; thus, FID is syntactically independent but not deictically. FID has been called, in 1913, “veiled speech” (*verschleierte Rede*) by the German critic Theodor Kalepky on the grounds that the absence of a reporting verb (*verbum dicendi*) and a subordinating conjunction causes the reported discourse to put on “the grammatical disguise of a narrated fact” or description (Hernadi, 1972, p. 36; see also Ginsburg, 1977).

Banfield (1973) argues that, unlike ID, FID is an expressive/narrative style, and not a communicative/reportive style, so it is natural that in FID the referents of the pronouns used by the character-focalizer, or “the subject-of-consciousness” in Banfield’s terminology (p. 29), remain unidentified; the character-focalizer, instead, may use words that indicate their relation with the referent at issue, e.g., “daddy” or “Tom,” while the narrator refers to that character generally as “Thomas.” Likewise, Rimmon-Kenan (2008) considers nomenclature or the use of various names by the character-focalizer a verbal indicator of internal focalization, an instrument of which is FID.

According to McHale (2004), such syntactical/linguistic features as the ones mentioned above are only one group of indices that help us identify FID in a given text. In addition to grammar/syntax, he proposes four other categories of FID indicators: intonation, context, idiom/register, and content. His proposed indices may be summed up as follows:

- 1) Grammar: “modal auxiliaries which refer to speculation or a supposed obligation or permission” (e.g., “must,” “would,” “could,” and “might”), “implying a speaker whose point of view is different from the narrator’s”; sentence adverbs “expressing doubt, certainty, speculation, or supposition” (e.g., “certainly,” “perhaps,” and “probably”); and the co-presence of the spatiotemporal adverbs “here” and “now” with past-tense verbs.

- 2) Intonation: an index first mentioned by Vološinov in a metaphorical sense; not “the actual physical intonation of an utterance, but [...] a semantic category which is distinct from ‘message’ but related to the character’s and narrator’s respective ‘evaluative orientations’.”
- 3) (Linguistic) context (= co-text): reporting verbs immediately preceding/following, or both preceding and following, the FID sentence or sometimes inserted medially in the form of a comment clause (parenthetical tag); the establishment of FID “in the immediate neighborhood of DD or ID sentences, especially when one or more FID sentences occur after an initial sentence of ID.”
- 4) Idiom/register: colloquialism; “lexical fillers” (e.g., “yes,” “of course,” and “well”); evaluative expressions (e.g., “poor” or “dear”) that assume “the presence of an evaluative speaker other than the narrator”; styles or languages different from the narrator’s general style or language; markers of social class, occupational groups, and gender.
- 5) Content: in the Bakhtinian sense, i.e., the “global reflection of a dialogic relationship with some other utterance.” (Adapted from McHale, 2004, pp. 199-207)

Although McHale (2004) criticizes previous theorists on the grounds that they have not clarified the exact meanings of such vague terms as “context,” “empathy,” and “irony,” ironically the same flaw can be identified in his own work. Indeed, his ambiguous categories “intonation” and “content” cannot be practically effective in identifying FID in narrative fiction.

2.8. Major Functions of FID

Having examined the textual markers of FID, now we can deal with its possible functions and effects in fictional narratives. Ginsburg (1977) believes that FID should not be considered merely as a decorative device in narrative fiction because even at the level of single sentences it may adequately suggest the overall themes and concerns of the narrative. Similarly, McHale (2004) postulates that FID may have an infinite number of possible functions, because each instance of FID serves singular structural and/or thematic functions in the narrative at issue, which makes generalization practically impossible. According to McHale, therefore, the exact function of any FID passage must primarily be determined within the context of its use and in relation to the overall themes of the narrative text in question. This notwithstanding, McHale considers such functions as only “second-order” functions, i.e., “functions of [first-order] functions” (p. 207), the latter denoting those general functions of FID that can be observed in almost all narratives. This section surveys the first-order effects and functions of FID, which can be divided into three categories: authorial and textual functions as well as what McHale (2004) refers to as FID’s “meta-functions” (p. 208).

2.8.1. Authorial Functions of FID

As an authorial function, FID permits the writer “considerable freedom in choosing how many of the character’s words to use and how precisely to present them” (Dry, 2002, p. 99). Furthermore, due to the vocal ambiguity of FID the narrator can comment on the narrative or characters without overt explanation (Flavin, 1985). Fowler (1996) puts it another way, stating that by using FID the author has the ability to place together “two sets of values” and “to imply a critique of the character’s views” without passing overt judgments as in classical narratives (p. 174). Thus, FID is a labor-saving device, in line with what may be dubbed “narrative economy.” Likewise, Franz K. Stanzel (1992) deems FID as “perhaps the most supple of all the elements of narrative grammar” since it “facilitates the transitions between narratorial and figural thoughts [= internal focalization]” (p. 121). FID gives the writer another advantage,

helping them to avoid “a monotonous procession of tags,” contrary to DD and ID (Palmer, 2005, p. 605). Moreover, the immediacy of FID renders it an effectual technique for depicting “situations of tension, crisis, upheaval, turmoil, spiritual searching, and inward struggle” (Palmer, 2005, p. 605). Humphrey (1954), in a similar fashion, considers this one of the functions of SOC in Modernist fiction.

According to Pasolini (1976), who following Vološinov takes a Marxist angle on the (authorial) functions of FID, the recourse to FID in both literature and cinema carries socio-political implications: that through FID the author (= narrator) can mimic the socially different language of a character suggests a sort of class consciousness on their part. For Pasolini, the author, as an artist, is a member of the elite, whose language is socially superior to that of the lower- or middle-class character, but if the author employs FID, then, it shows that they are conscious of other people’s languages and, as a result, of their ideologies and allows them to be expressed. Pasolini further explains that, however, bourgeois writers who lack any kind of class consciousness, that is, a concern for other (lower) people’s preoccupations, use the language of marginalized characters in FID as a pretext to convey their own middle-class worldview, to the extent that what the FIDs represent is ultimately the author’s biased voice, having been put in those characters’ mouths. Therefore, to Pasolini, the ambiguity of FID lies in the fact that, on the surface, it represents the subjective viewpoint of the character at issue and is characterized by their register, tone, or style but, beneath the surface, it represents the author’s subjective point of view.

As Joe Hughes (2009) reports, Gilles Deleuze, the language-conscious French thinker (1925-1995), was so obsessed with the capacities of FID as a polyvocal linguistic form that throughout his entire philosophical *oeuvre*, conceived of by himself as a series of “novels” rather than philosophical treatises, he rarely stated anything directly and, instead, mostly conveyed his ideas through ID or FID. FID occurs in Deleuze’s texts when his authorial/narratorial voice is conflated with another author’s, e.g., Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) or Henri Bergson’s (1859-1941), to the extent that the reader cannot decide whether the idea he is reading belongs to Deleuze himself or to the other authors in question. As Louis-Georges Schwartz (2005) remarks, one consequence of this use of FID in theoretical, philosophical, or scientific texts is that in this way the author will, consciously or not, escape responsibility for what is said by ascribing it implicitly or explicitly to other authors, which is legally and ethically a significant issue (for Deleuze’s view of FID, see below).

2.8.2. Textual Functions of FID

FID can also serve several textual functions or effects. For example, it is a means for handling the cognitive-emotive distance between the character-focalizer and the narrator in the narrative discourse: On the one side, FID may reflect the narrator’s ironic attitude toward the character and, on the other, it may evoke the reader’s empathy/sympathy for the character (McHale, 2009). Of course, there might be ambiguous cases that cause the reader grave difficulty in choosing between an ironic or empathetic attitude (Rimmon-Kenan, 2008). Empathy is a consequence of intimacy: FID sometimes fosters intimacy between the reader and the character-focalizer, and this intimacy often leads to empathy. If the narrator represents the character’s discourse in such a way as to reproach them for a fault, defect, or weakness, instead of intimacy an emotive or cognitive distance, which is often ironic, is created between the reader and that character.

Furthermore, employing FID may entail dramatic irony in the narrative if the character is not aware of what the narrator reveals about their inner processes, while the reader can realize this discrepancy. Of course, this occurs only when the FID is attributable to the character and with

the assumption that the reader's knowledge of the story world or the general context of the FID is deeper or vaster than the character's. Sometimes, this deeper knowledge is not achieved at the moment of reading the FID sentence yet, and the competent reader might realize the discrepancy within that specific FID sentence later in the reading process. According to McHale (2004), another sort of irony resulting from FID is what Charles Jones calls "irony of register" (p. 208), that is, the association of the formal or literary style of the narrative as a whole and the non-literary style of FID sentences.

When FID is the representation of the character's discourse, and not the narrator's, it can be said to have been used by the narrator for objectifying the character, subjecting them to narratorial judgment and ideology (Ginsburg, 1977). Moreover, as was mentioned in previous sections, Simpson and Montgomery (2002) believe that FID is an index of internal focalization or representing the focalized from within, stating that FID "is often used to create abrupt transitions from narrative description into the active mind of the central character" (p. 152). Toolan (2001) and Jahn (2005) share the same idea. However, perhaps the first theorist who explicitly regarded FID as an index of internal focalization was Genette (1983b). It also seems that FIT happens when the character-focalizer starts to reflect upon themselves, that is, internal focalization of the character from within.

Pasolini (1976) attempts to distinguish FID from IM, but the result is rather vague as he does not clarify what he exactly means by "IM" and when he compares it with FID, it is not clear whether he means IIM or DIM. Many other critics, such as Fowler (1996), consider SOC and IM the same and FID as the opposite technique. Actually, by "SOC" and "IM" such critics are referring to what Humphrey (1954) terms "DIM." To disambiguate the relationship between these terms, it serves us better to use "DIM" for this concept and reserve "SOC" for the general approach to the representation of the associative, disorganized, illogical, and apparently ungrammatical flux of a character's thoughts and perceptions in narrative fiction, something roughly equal to internal focalization (at its extreme). Thus, discourse report (= description by an omniscient author), FDD (= DIM), and FID (= IIM) are possible techniques for the representation of characters' SOC in narrative fiction. The most effective device among them seems to be FID. Before this, Banfield (1973), McHale (2004, 2009), Rimmon-Kenan (2008), and Jahn (2005), among others, have proposed that FID is a useful form for textualizing SOC in narrative fiction. McHale (2004) argues that FID, particularly its subcategory FIP, has the capacity to represent the pre- or sub-verbal layers of consciousness. Rimmon-Kenan's (2008) reason for the suitability of FID for representing SOC is "its capacity to reproduce the idiolect of a character's speech or thought [...] within the narrator's reporting language" (p. 115). The difference between FDD and FID, then, lies in the narrator's role and the degree of their presence within the text: in FDD, the narrator seems totally absent, whereas in FID traces of their presence are observed. Discussing the difference between DIM and IIM, Humphrey (1954), in a similar way, argues that in IIM the reader feels the narrator's continuous presence (the "author's" in his own terminology) and that there is the possibility of coherence and greater surface unity in IIM, while at the same time the sense of psychological realism and the depiction of the character's mental events are conveyed.

Another textual function of FID goes back to social aspects of language. As Simon Dentith (2005) reports, according to Vološinov, as a follower of Bakhtin's theory of language, grammar, style, and questions of sociology are intertwined and through analyzing the different modes of DR, including FID, Vološinov tries to show "language is something that exists between people" (p. 30). "Polyvocality" is the defining feature of FID for Vološinov (McHale, 2004). That is, in FID the narrator's and the character's voices interact with each other directly, especially when the narrator has an empathetic attitude toward the character, but neither of the voices is dominant over the other. This resembles Bakhtin's idea that "polyphony" works at all levels in a text, from single words to its grand structures (McHale, 2004). "Polyphony" in fictional

narratives is defined by Bakhtin (1999) as the presence of a “plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses,” the existence of “fully valid voices [...] with equal rights and each with its own world, combine[d] but [...] not merged in the unity of the event” or “by a single authorial/[narratorial] consciousness” (p. 6). Following Bakhtin, Rimmon-Kenan (2008) also deems “polyphony” as the fundamental feature of narrative texts, but she considers two subtypes for the polyphony in FID: “intra-textual” polyphony (various voices coexisting in FID) and “inter-textual” polyphony (the character’s coloring in FID orients it toward previous utterances) (p. 118).

Since it leads to vocal ambiguity or polyphony in the narrative, FID adds to the “textuality” of the narrative in question, making it—in Roland Barthes’s (1974) terminology—a “writerly” (*scriptible*) text, as opposed to “readerly” (*lisible*) texts (p. 4). In the writerly text, as the ideal form of textuality from the viewpoint of (post)structuralist theory,

the networks [of signification] are many and intersect, without any one of them being able to surpass the rest; this text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds; [...] we gain access to it by several entrances, none of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main one. (Barthes, 1974, p. 5)

Thus, apart from pluralizing the thematic structure of the narrative text by undermining authorial and/or narratorial authority, FID causes the competent reader of such texts to become an active participant in the construction of this plural textuality, rather than being a passive consumer of predetermined or predictable meanings enforced by conventional codes.

FID is also can be regarded as a means of “defamiliarization” in narrative fiction—the concept originally advanced in 1916 by Victor Shklovsky (1893-1984), a leading Russian Formalist. According to Shklovsky (2017), by deviating from the norms of conventional language, art shatters the reader’s automatized or habitual perceptions of reality. This act of defamiliarization slows down the process of perception, causes the subject to attend to aspects of reality in the story world and, consequently, in actual life that used to remain unheeded. This, in turn, gives the reader aesthetic pleasure. As a form that deviates from normal DR modes in actual everyday language and is peculiar to modern prose fictional narratives, FID alters our conventional perception of discourse events, directs our attention to different aspects of the character-focalizer’s condition and, thus, defamiliarizes our understanding of the realities represented in the narrative text.

Last but not least, according to Rimmon-Kenan (2008), the co-presence of alternative voices, as a result of FID, enhances “the semantic density of the text” (p. 115). Palmer (2005) believes that the characteristic vocal ambiguity of FID may lead to “interesting and complex confusions over shifting points of view” (p. 605). This reinforces the text’s potential for yielding various interpretations. Semantic density in literary language has been one of the primary criteria adopted by a group of philosophers to define literature in general. For instance, Monroe C. Beardsley (1958) offers the following semantic definition for literature: “a literary work is a discourse in which an important part of the meaning is implicit” (p. 126), a condition completely and uniquely fulfilled by polyvocal FID. Thus, within the framework of the semantic definition of literature, FID can be said to be a manifestation of literary discourse *par excellence*.

Up to this point, the major authorial and textual effects and functions of FID were enumerated. As Helen Aristar Dry (2002) explains, overall, the major textual effects of FID appear to be generating a certain degree of empathy in the reader with the focal character and producing ambiguity with regard to the source of the voice we hear in the text. As Dry herself asserts, these two were first considered as the major functions of FID by Dorrit Cohn.

2.8.3. Meta-Functions of FID

As one of the possible meta-functions of FID in narrative fiction, one can postulate that it is a realization of what Jacques Derrida (1982), the poststructuralist French thinker (1930-2004), calls “différance” (p. 3) and sees as the basic feature of all language, although Derrida never directly dealt with FID in his intellectual career. To him, “*différance* is [...] the ‘active’, moving discord of different forces, and of differences of forces” (p. 18), a quality best exemplified by polyvocal or bivocal FID. This signifies that meaning or signified is always and already subject to an endless process of difference (spatial difference from other signs within the same semiotic system) and deferral (temporal difference or postponement of signification). As Derrida (1982) explains, the French verb *différer*

in this sense is to temporize, to take recourse, consciously or unconsciously, in the temporal and temporizing mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or fulfillment of “desire” or “will,” and equally effects this suspension in a mode that annuls or tempers its own effect. (p. 8)

The vocal ambiguity in FID, thus, results in such a constant process of *différance*, deterring the narrative from confining itself to one single stable, fixed meaning or theme. Derrida’s argument suggests that the fundamental aim of literature is to reveal the way *différance* works in language or, in other words, how literary texts are self-deconstructive. Accordingly, the positive ambiguity of FID sentences—which are all different from one another and are defined only in terms of other DR modes—constantly defers the meaning of the narrative text and subjects the reader to the free play of signifiers.

Deleuze and Guattari (1986), poststructuralist French thinkers, see FID as a principal feature of all great literature, which they term “minor literature”: “that which a minority constructs within a major language,” a main characteristic of which “is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization” (p. 16). More broadly, in minor literature “everything takes on a collective value,” in as much as “there are no possibilities for an individuated enunciation that would belong to this or that ‘master’ and that could be separated from a collective enunciation” (p. 17). Polyvocal FID possesses a singular quality that associates it with minor language and, consequently, with minor literature, to the extent that it can be considered as the epitome of both, and that singular quality is nothing but its potential for including various voices or forces of becoming-different, rather than being/remaining the same:

minor languages [...] are not simply sublanguages, idiolects, or dialects but potential agents of the major language’s entering into a becoming-minoritarian of all of its dimensions and elements. [...] Minorities [...] must also be thought of as seeds, crystals of becoming whose value is to trigger uncontrollable movements and deterritorializations of the mean or majority. That is why Pasolini demonstrated that the essential thing, precisely in *free indirect discourse*, is to be found neither in language A, nor in language B, but “in language X, which is none other than language A in the actual process of becoming language B.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 117; emphasis added)

Thus, Deleuze and Guattari (2004) follow the accepted definition of FID as an utterance that simultaneously includes (at least) the two voices of the narrator and the character (the dual-voice hypothesis). However, following Vološinov, they treat FID as a variant of ID and even take a step further than Vološinov to argue that DD is also a variant of and is extracted from ID. Therefore, what they see as the meta-functions of FID can also hold true for ID, which they define generally as the incorporation of an utterance within another that is—particularly in the form of FID—superior to DD, because (F)ID reveals the power of language to express “collective assemblages”:

[...] indirect discourse, *especially “free” indirect discourse*, is of exemplary value: there are no clear, distinctive contours; [...] not an insertion of variously individuated statements, or an interlocking of different subjects of enunciation, but a collective assemblage resulting in the determination of relative subjectification proceedings, or assignments of individuality and their shifting distributions within discourse. [Free] Indirect discourse is not explained by the distinction between subjects; rather, it is the assemblage [...] that explains all the voices present within a single voice [...]. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 88; emphasis in the original)

As such, (F)ID reveals that there is no coherent, unified subjectivity behind language but rather “the ongoing nature of deterritorialization” (Grisham, 1991, p. 47) and that “language does not operate between something seen or felt and something said, but always goes from saying to saying” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 85). Here, they seem to have been inspired by Vološinov’s Bakhtinian idea that “dialogue,” the core element of language, manifests itself vividly in (F)ID (Grisham, 1991). In consequence, for Deleuze and Guattari all language is (F)ID or, put differently, FID is an index of language in general.

In Deleuze and Guattari’s (1986) thought, “deterritorialization” refers to the quality of an assemblage that “always has a line of escape by which it escapes itself and makes its enunciations or its expressions take flight and disarticulate”; an “assemblage extends over or penetrates *an unlimited field of immanence* that makes the segments melt and [...] liberates desire from all its concretizations and abstractions” (p. 86; emphasis in the original). By the Deleuzeoguattarian account, FID indicates that language is a means for producing subjects (subjectivation) rather than a means for communication, information, or representation. FID, like ID and the infinitive, “takes the voice away from the speaking subject to an anonymous or pre-personal saying,” thereby demonstrating “how language frees itself from speakers and intentions” and frees signs from any single origin (Colebrook, 2002, p. 113). This is the event dubbed “deterritorialization” by Deleuze and Guattari (cf. Ginsburg’s (1977) similar idea, explained above). According to Deleuze and Guattari, through FID all great writers formulate a “foreign language” that creates difference or reveals the forces of becoming at the heart of literature and, indeed, life itself (Marks, 1997, p. 234); thus, FID indicates that literature does not stem from the personal experience of a homogeneous subject but it rises above the personal and the subjective and, thereby displaying the heterogeneity of language, subjectivity, literature, and life.

McHale (2004) opines that FID is “an index of the literary”: He believes that FID is a distinctive feature of “literary prose or at least ‘literariness’ in prose” and that its bivocality reflects the most characteristic feature of the novel as a genre; in sum, FID “is distinctively literary [...] because the essential character of literature itself is inscribed in miniature within it” (p. 215). (Cf. the idea of semantic density as a textual function of FID, discussed above.) Likewise, Ginsburg (1977) argues that the significance of FID may lie in its capacity to expose the defining feature of novelistic discourse: “its existence both as representation of an object and as in itself an object of representation” (p. 29). He further explicates that FID reveals the fact that “not only the narrator [= subject] is not distinct from his characters [= object] [...], but also language is not distinct from events”; thus, “subject and object dissolve into each other” and representation “which guarantees the distance between them is in serious danger” (p. 35).

Rimmon-Kenan (2008) shares the same idea when, redoubling McHale’s (2004) above-mentioned dictum about FID as an index of the literary, she postulates that FID “paradoxically gains the status of a miniature reflection of the nature of all texts and all language” (p. 116). She bases this notion on Derrida’s argument that “language always quotes other language, constituting itself on linguistic iterability and cultural clichés whose direct utterers are nowhere

present” (p. 116). Then, she concludes that “all language is a kind of FID” (p. 116). What Rimmon-Kenan indirectly quotes from Derrida is reminiscent of Julia Kristeva’s (1980) Bakhtinian notion of “intertextuality,” which sees every text as a “mosaic of quotations,” shaped by the absorption and transformation of various other written or spoken texts (p. 66). By her account, intertextuality signifies “a permutation of texts” as different utterances meet one another and affect one another’s significations (p. 36). This theory suggests that “words and linguistic/grammatical structures pre-exist the individual speaker and the individual speech” (Wolfreys, Womack, & Robbins, 2014, p. 60). Therefore, polyphony, intertextuality, dialogicity, *différance*, and deterritorialization are general conditions of (literary) language that are most manifest in FID.

3. Conclusion

After investigating the concept of discourse representation (DR) in narrative fiction based on the quadripartite model established in narratology, which includes direct discourse (DD), indirect discourse (ID), free direct discourse (FDD), and free indirect discourse (FID), this article offered a synthesis of structuralist and poststructuralist theories of FID as a vocally ambiguous discursive technique in English-language prose narrative fiction within the framework of the now-classic account known as the “dual-voice hypothesis.” The purpose of this study was to reach a thorough poetics of FID for understanding its major markers and functions and elucidating its relations to the pre-narratological terms “stream of consciousness” (SOC) and “interior monologue” (IM) as well as the narratological concepts of focalization and narrative voice.

It was argued that, in broad terms, DD, FDD, and FID are used for textualizing internal focalization (from within) in narrative fiction and ID and discourse report for external focalization. Moreover, the study equated the pre-narratological concepts direct interior monologue (DIM) and indirect interior monologue (IIM), respectively, with the narratological terms FDD and FID. The study also suggested that the variety of voices conjoined through polyvocal FID in the narrative text may lead to different and even perhaps conflictual interpretations, as in such ambiguous cases the source of the voice heard within the narrative discourse cannot be exactly identified. In addition to these functions, this study showed that FID can reveal the author’s/narrator’s class consciousness or their possible middle-class biases toward fictional characters; it can be used as means for escaping responsibility for what is stated in the text by attributing it to other authors or fictional figures; and it can demonstrate the narrator’s ironic attitude toward the characters or raise certain degrees of empathy/sympathy in the reader for the characters. To illuminate the major authorial and textual functions as well as the meta-functions of bivocal and polyvocal FID, formalist notions such as Monroe C. Beardsley’s semantic density and Victor Shklovsky’s defamiliarization together with poststructuralist concepts such as Mikhail Bakhtin’s polyphony, Roland Barthes’s writerly text, Julia Kristeva’s intertextuality, Jacques Derrida’s *différance*, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s deterritorialization were discussed in relation to FID. Ultimately, the results indicated that FID is an index of minor language and minor literature (according to Deleuze and Guattari’s definition) and, of course, an index of the (literary) narrative.

Since the present study delimited its scope to the dual-voice theory of FID, future researchers can offer similar theoretical syntheses of the nature and functions of this discursive technique with other critical approaches, especially the theory of the meta-functions of language (experiential/ ideational, textual, and interpersonal) in functional(ist) stylistics and such theories as text world theory, cognitive deixis theory, and schema theory in cognitive narratology/stylistics/poetics.

Conflict of Interest

The author states that there is no conflict of interest.

References

- Bakhtin, M. (1999). *Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics* (C. Emerson, Trans.). University of Minnesota Press.
- Bal, M. (2004). Narration and focalization. In M. Bal (Ed.), *Narrative theory: Critical concepts in literary and cultural studies* (Vol. 1, pp. 263–296). Routledge.
- Bally, Ch. (1912). Le Style indirect libre en français moderne I. *Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift*, 4, 549–56.
- Banfield, A. (1973). Narrative style and the grammar of direct and indirect speech. *Foundations of Language*, 10(1), 1–39.
- Banfield, A. (1982). *Unspeakable sentences: Narration and representation in the language of fiction*. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Barthes, R. (1974). *S/Z* (R. Miller, Trans.). Hill and Wang.
- Beardsley, M. C. (1958). *Aesthetics: Problems in the philosophy of criticism*. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
- Bortolussi, M., & Dixon, P. (2003). *Psychonarratology: Foundations for the empirical study of literary response*. Cambridge University Press.
- Chatman, S. (1980). *Story and discourse: Narrative structure in fiction and film*. Cornell University Press.
- Cohn, D. (1978). *Transparent minds: Narrative modes for presenting consciousness in fiction*. Princeton University Press.
- Colebrook, C. (2002). *Gilles Deleuze*. Routledge.
- Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1986). *Kafka: Toward a minor literature* (D. Polan, Trans.). University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2004). *A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia* (B. Massumi, Trans.). Continuum.
- Dentith, S. (2005). *Bakhtinian thought: An introductory reader*. Routledge.
- Derrida, J. (1982). *Margins of philosophy* (A. Bass, Trans.). The Harvester Press.
- Dry, H. A. (2002). Free indirect discourse in Doris Lessing's "One Off the Short List": A case of designed ambiguity. In P. Verdonk & J. J. Weber (Eds.), *Twentieth-century fiction: From text to context* (pp. 96–112). Routledge.
- Flavin, L. (1985). *The aesthetic effects of free indirect discourse in the novels of Jane Austen* [Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Cincinnati].
- Fludernik, M. (2005a). Speech representation. In D. Herman, M. Jahn, & M.-L. Ryan (Eds.), *The Routledge encyclopedia of narrative theory* (pp. 558–563). Routledge.
- Fludernik, M. (2005b). *The fictions of language and the languages of fiction: The linguistic representation of speech and consciousness*. Routledge.
- Fowler, R. (1989). *Linguistics and the novel*. Routledge.
- Fowler, R. (1996). *Linguistic criticism* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
- Genette, G. (1983a). *Narrative discourse: An essay in method* (J. E. Lewin, Trans.). Cornell University Press.
- Genette, G. (1983b). *Nouveau discours du récit*. Éditions du Seuil.
- Ghaffary, M., & Hashemi, M. (2024). "To live even one day": A comparative narratological study of the representation of characters' discourses in Virginia Woolf's *Mrs Dalloway* and Marleen Gorris's cinematic adaptation. *The International Journal of Humanities*, 31(3), 49–67. <https://dx.doi.org/10.48311/eijh.31.3.4>
- Ghaffary, M., & Nojournian, A. A. (2013a). A poetics of free indirect discourse in narrative film. *Rupkatha Journal on Interdisciplinary Studies in Humanities*, 5(2), 269–281. <https://rupkatha.com/free-indirect-discourse/>

- Ghaffary, M., & Nojournian, A. A. (2013b). Free indirect discourse and its significance in narrative stylistics: A comparative study of Modernist and pre-Modernist fiction. *Critical Language and Literary Studies*, 5(8), 85–117. [In Persian] https://clls.sbu.ac.ir/article_99482.html
- Ginsburg, M. P. (1977). *Free indirect discourse: Theme and narrative voice in Flaubert, George Eliot, and Verga* [Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University].
- Grisham, Th. (1991). Linguistics as an indisciplin: Deleuze and Guattari's pragmatics. *SubStance*, 20(3), 36–54.
- Hernadi, P. (1972). Dual perspective: Free indirect discourse and related techniques. *Comparative Literature*, 24(1), 32–43.
- Hughes, J. (2009). *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A reader's guide*. Continuum.
- Humphrey, R. (1954). *Stream of consciousness in the modern novel*. University of California Press.
- Jahn, M. (2005). Narratology: A guide to the theory of narrative. English Department, University of Cologne. <https://www.uni-koeln.de/~ame02/pppn.html>
- Jahn, M. (2025). Narratology 3.0: A guide to the theory of narrative. English Department, University of Cologne. <https://www.uni-koeln.de/~ame02/pppn.pdf>
- Joyce, J. (2001). The dead. In L. Davies (Ed.), *Dubliners* (pp. 127–160). Wordsworth Editions Limited.
- Kristeva, J. (1980). *Desire in language: A semiotic approach to literature and art* (T. Gora, A. Jardine, & L. S. Roudiez, Trans., L. S. Roudiez, Ed.). Columbia University Press.
- Leech, G. N., & Short, M. H. (2007). *Style in fiction: A linguistic introduction to English fictional prose* (2nd ed.). Longman.
- Lodge, D. (1992). *The art of fiction, Illustrated from classic and modern texts*. Viking Penguin.
- Lubbock, P. (1921) *The craft of fiction*. Cape.
- Marks, J. (1997). Deleuze and literature: Metaphor and indirect discourse. *Social Semiotics*, 7(2), 233–246.
- Matz, J. (2004). *The modern novel: A short introduction*. Blackwell Publishing.
- McHale, B. (2004). Free indirect discourse: A survey of recent accounts. In M. Bal (Ed.), *Narrative theory: Critical concepts in literary and cultural studies* (Vol. 1, pp. 187–222). Routledge.
- McHale, B. (2009). Speech representation. In P. Hühn, et al. (Eds.), *Handbook of narratology* (pp. 434–446). Walter de Gruyter.
- Oxford English dictionary* (2009). Second edition on CD-ROM (v. 4.0). Oxford University Press.
- Page, N. (1988). *Speech in the English novel* (2nd ed.). Macmillan.
- Palmer, A. (2004). *Fictional minds*. University of Nebraska Press.
- Palmer, A. (2005). Thought and consciousness representation (literature). In D. Herman, M. Jahn, & M.-L. Ryan (Eds.), *The Routledge encyclopedia of narrative theory* (pp. 602–607). Routledge.
- Pascal, R. (1977). *The dual voice: Free indirect speech and its functioning in the nineteenth-century European novel*. Manchester University Press.
- Pasolini, P. P. (1976). The cinema of poetry (M. de Vettimo & J. Bontemps, Trans.). In B. Nichols (Ed.), *Movies and methods* (Vol. 1, pp. 542–558). University of California Press.
- Prince, G. (2003). *A dictionary of narratology* (revised ed.). University of Nebraska Press.
- Rimmon-Kenan, Sh. (2008). *Narrative fiction: Contemporary poetics* (2nd ed.). Routledge.
- Schmid, W. (2010). *Narratology: An introduction* (A. Starritt, Trans.). Walter de Gruyter.
- Schwartz, L.-G. (2005). Typewriter: Free indirect discourse in Deleuze's *Cinema*. *SubStance*, 34(3), 107–135.
- Shklovsky, V. (2017). Art as technique. In J. Rivkin & M. Ryan (Eds.), *Literary theory: An anthology* (3rd ed., pp. 8–14). Blackwell Publishing.

- Short, M. (2013). *Exploring the language of poems, plays, and prose*. Routledge.
- Simpson, P., & Montgomery, M. (2002). Language, literature, and film: The stylistics of Bernard Maclaverty's *Cal*. In P. Verdonk & J. J. Weber (Eds.), *Twentieth-century fiction: From text to context* (pp. 138–164). Routledge.
- Stallworthy, J., & Ramazani, J. (2018). The twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In S. Greenblatt (Ed.), *The Norton anthology of English literature* (10th ed., Vol. F, pp. 3–30). W. W. Norton & Company.
- Stanzel, F. K. (1992). Consonant and dissonant closure in *Death in Venice* and “The Dead.” In A. Fehn, I. Hoesterey, & M. Tatar (Eds.), *Neverending stories: Toward a critical narratology* (pp. 112–123). Princeton University Press.
- Tobler, A. (1887). Vermischte Beiträge zur französischen Grammatik. *Zeitschrift für Romanische Philologie* 11, 433–461.
- Toolan, M. (2001). *Narrative: A critical-linguistic introduction* (2nd ed.). Routledge.
- Vološinov, V. N. (1973). *Marxism and the philosophy of language* (L. Matejka & I. R. Titunik, Trans.). Harvard University Press.
- Wales, K. (2014). *A dictionary of stylistics* (3rd ed.). Routledge.
- Wolfreys, J., Womack, K., & Robbins, R. (2014). *Key concepts in literary theory* (3rd ed.). Edinburgh University Press.